We Were Cops Once . . . and Young
Brief History of the Baltimore Police Department Quick Response Teams
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The history of QRT is written large by many of its members then and now. Contributing to that
history and to the writing of this history were: (In alphabetical order) Doug Bryson, Steve
Coughlan, Paul Davis, David Datsko, Steve Kuhn, John Maguire, Mike Mulligan, Ed Schillo,
Sam Tress, and Curtis Willis. These men took time out from very busy schedules to provide
their recollection of milestones, salient events, dates, and photos of that history. Each
contributed mightily when they were in the teams and did so as well to this writing. Also, others
I couldn’t contact deserve recognition for their contribution to bringing the teams and their
equipment into the 21th century. Eventually, through the determined efforts of men like John
Christian, Jerry DeManss, Bob Edwards, Don Healy, Ray Jones, Bob Letmate, John
Lewandowski, Jan Richmond and unsung others, the Baltimore Police Department’s SWAT
teams were turned into an internationally recognized, professional unit worthy of any police
department in the world.
My own efforts in starting QRT were minimal in comparison to some, if not all, of these men. I
just happened to be in the right place and had, according to some supporters and opponents alike,
the bullish temperament and unyielding nature that was required at the beginning to keep the
sometimes square wheels from totally falling off the QRT machine long enough for the program
to endure. The aforementioned men took that humble start and turned it into what it has become
today. It was an honor to have worked with them and a privilege to write about what their efforts
have achieved.
PROLOGUE
With apologies to Lt. General Harold Moore for co-opting, in part, the title of his book about the
7th Calvary’s insertion into the la Drang Valley in Vietnam in 1965, the nearing of the 40th
anniversary of the beginning of the Baltimore Police Department’s Quick Response Teams has
caused me to reflect back on that time and the good men who went above and beyond the call of
duty to drag the department into a new and necessary element of policing in the 20th Century.
I’m certainly not comparing the sacrifices of the troops of the 7th Calvary on the battlefield to the
trials and tribulations of those first QRT officers. While those first officers did face dangerous
situations with inferior equipment and minimal training, their main battle was one of survival in
a department which was staffed by a command element, except for an important few, and rank
and file officers who became apoplectic at even the whispered thought of SWAT being amongst
them. Those men’s willingness to train in their off-duty time, spend their own money to buy
equipment, and suffer the constant derisive comments by brother officers laid a foundation for
the outstanding unit QRT/SWAT has become. The following quote from Theodore Roosevelt’s
"The Man In The Arena" speech at the Sorbonne in Paris, France on April 23, 1910 applies to
those men and to their critics as well:
It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the
strong man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done
them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the
arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives
valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and again, because there
is no effort without error and shortcoming; but who does actually
strive to do the deeds; who knows great enthusiasms, the great
devotions; who spends himself in a worthy cause; who at the best
knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who at the
worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place
shall never be with those cold and timid souls who neither know
victory nor defeat.
One factor that caused a measure of resentment/jealousy by command and the rank and file was
the portrayal of SWAT cops in the 70's television program “SWAT.” Even the name connoted
violence; i.e., to crush a fly with a single swat. The program exaggerated the image of the
operators as being glory boys whose main job was to lift weights, run endless loops through
obstacle courses, jump off of buildings or out of perfectly good helicopters, suck down copious
amounts of CS gas without blinking, play with various guns, and generally look good for the
cameras when they leaped out of the back of a large, black, armored, very menacing looking,
truck with guns blazing. Admittedly, some of those activities–excluding jumping out of trucks
with guns blazing, etc.–were a necessary part of the job and attracted candidates who were drawn
to those types of endeavors. That image, however, served to heighten the intensity of the already
very intense interdepartmental power struggles, political patronage, and turf protecting in the
command ranks, which made launching the QRT program damn near impossible. Finally,
limited funds and the necessity of committing manpower to street crime reduction operations
determined the nature, quality, and quantity of equipment that could be purchased; the time and
manpower that could be committed to the training program; and the deployment operational
strategies of the teams on the street.
Although the “SWAT” television program is no longer on the air, the image it perpetrated still
survives to a limited extent and still affects the public’s image of SWAT. As proof of this,
consider that any nationally televised SWAT type incident will invariably result in outcries from
various and sundry community “leaders” regarding the militarization of police departments.
Interdepartmental power struggles, patronage assignments, and turf protecting, however, are very
much reduced, albeit not absent, in today’s department. This positive change is due in part to the
record of the QRT’s performance over the years; in part to the ascension to command ranks by
officers who came on and worked with officers who were assigned to the teams; and in part to
the increasingly violent situations occasioned by the prevalence of narcotics driven crimes, mass
murders by active shooters, and the very real specter of terrorism. Limited funds and the
requirement of committing manpower to street crime reduction operations will, by necessity,
always affect SWAT training, operations, and the purchase of equipment.
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IN THE BEGINNING
By emphasizing the resistance of many of the command staff to the idea of having SWAT in the
department, the door is opened for the reader to wonder how I, a brand new sergeant, came to be
exposed to the inner workings of the top levels of the department. In the police totem pole, I was
down around the toe level. In the early summer of 1975, I was assigned by Colonel Bishop
Robinson, Chief of Patrol, to write the General Order authorizing SWAT and the regulations
pertaining to the resolution of sniper/barricade/hostage situations. That assignment morphed into
writing the justification for SWAT, its operational procedures, training program, and selection
protocols. I didn’t have any operational background that qualified me to undertake those tasks. I
spent countless hours studying foreign and domestic terrorist incidents, military manuals, other
agencies’ SOP’s, General Orders, and training programs to try to put it all together into a
cohesive program. Doing that research and finalizing the program meant that I was frequently
involved in strategy sessions in the Tac Commander’s office, Captain Joe Bolesta, a strong
advocate for the teams. He was a man who was not always completely circumspect in describing
the efforts to stymy the founding of the teams by a well entrenched opposition faction in the
department’s command staff. Those meetings, and having numerous training sessions cancelled,
sometimes after they had begun, because the Deputy Commissioner of Operations thought they
were a waste of money, gave me a unique perspective of the breadth of the opposition to starting
the program and the determination of its supporters to overcome that opposition.
At the very top of the totem pole of supporters was Commissioner Donald Pomerleau. Those
that worked under him or knew him by reputation would assume that if he wanted it done, it
would be done. When it came to implementing his policies, however, just below him was
Deputy Commissioner of Operations, Frank Battaglia, a man with the reputation of being a
tough, old line, street-smart cop. Battaglia was adamantly opposed to SWAT and, at the very
least, was not overly disposed to support requests for money for training, equipment, etc. DC
Battiglia was a very powerful political figure in the police department and the direct superior of
Colonel Robinson. Battiglia’s political ties stemmed from the Italian community and particularly
to the former Mayor of Baltimore, Tommy D’Alesandro, the father of current California
Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi. The “Sons of Italy” social club, of which Battiglia was the head,
contained many members who were command officers in the Baltimore Police Department and
many local politicians.
To illustrate the sometimes visceral nature of the opposition the majority of the “Sons” held for
the SWAT concept, one of those command officers, a district commander who was a large man
known for his pugilistic abilities and proclivities, called Captain Bolesta and told him that if Key
kept criticizing how his troops performed in an armed man barricade in which a cop was shot by
other cops, he was going to “punch his lights out.” While I took the threat seriously, I had no
choice but to continue talking about the incident and the cluster-foul up it was. The incident
involved a shooter armed with a Browning Automatic Rifle knock-off. It had occurred a couple
of months prior to the Lombard and Carey debacle and was a major part of the rationale I was
using to convince the upper echelon that a special unit was needed to handle those types of
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situations. The major’s threat indicated to me that I was pushing the right buttons, so I continued
talking about the incident with renewed gusto. I also told Captain Bolesta that, in accordance
with the law, if confronted by someone who I reasonably believed posed a threat of serious injury
or death, I would use whatever weapons necessary to vigorously defend myself. Those weren’t
the exact words I used, but close enough.
Colonel Robinson, who was also a very powerful political figure within the department, was a
strong supporter of the SWAT concept and worked diligently to implement the program. The
two factions were sometimes engaged in a struggle for control of the department, and QRT was
frequently caught in the middle. QRT would never have gotten off the ground when it did
without the efforts of Captain Joe Bolesta and Colonel Bishop Robinson.
The Quick Response Team, now SWAT, began its storied journey in 1976. Prior to that,
dynamic entries and other SWAT type procedures were undertaken by members of the
Emergency Vehicle Unit, available officers assigned to the Tactical Section, and/or various
district personnel, none of whom had any meaningful training in carrying out those kinds of
functions. The primary method for going in and getting an armed bad guy was for whatever cops
that were on the scene to shoot the house full of holes and then the EVU guys would knock the
door down and drag said bad guy out. Sometimes they would be accompanied by members of
the command staff, particularly if the news media were present. The concept of QRT, modeled
after other cities’ SWAT, was conceived to institute control of those types of incidents with well
trained and disciplined officers.
The acronym QRT didn’t come about until shortly before Lombard and Carey, which occurred
April 16th, 1976. The name was chosen by Colonel Robinson after suggestions from TAC
personnel were solicited. The name was chosen partially because of the aggressive SWAT image
portrayed on the television program. The QRT opposition faction and some city government
officials thought the name SWAT conjured up all kinds of potentially evil and horrendous acts by
trigger happy warrior wannabes. On a more practical level, Colonel Robinson wanted to
distinguish the BPD from LAPD, NY, etc.; thus, QRT. In 2007 the team members voted, as was
their right, to finally be called SWAT.
There were no SWAT units, formal training by the Baltimore Police Department, or SWAT
operations until 1976. Once I had been given the job of writing the G.O., etc., in early summer
of 1975, my squad and I began physical fitness and some operational training on our own time.
Lieutenant Daryl Duggins put together a rappelling program, which he gave to various members
of his A Platoon, including my squad, A-3. That training was also conducted off-duty. Duggins
was, and still is, a much revered leader; a back to basics, no nonsense former Marine who did not
tolerate hijinks from the sometimes rowdy youths under his command. One of the first
rappelling training sessions he arranged was an approximately seventy foot drop from the Cedar
Avenue Bridge. Lieutenant Duggins had tried two methods of rappelling–the single rope favored
by the Marine Corp and the double rope favored by sane people. Several of us tried the single
rope first, including one or two former Marines. As we were blowing the fire out on our leather
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gloves we reached the unanimous decision that the double rope was best. Of course, this was all
well before fast roping techniques were developed.
The first approved on-duty training occurred in July of 1975. Members of A and B platoons
were sent down to Fort Meade to be trained by Army Marksmanship Training Unit 1 for a two
week counter sniper course. It was the first training in which the M-16's were used. Although
some of the days were twelve hour days, the troops were delighted to have any training and
participated with gusto. The next scheduled on-duty training was in February of 1976. A-3
squad was sent to the one week FBI SWAT school. It was held at Gunpowder and had one day
of entry problems down at the Army’s Ordnance Road facility. It involved several other police
departments and was well presented by the local FBI SWAT team. The attached photo is A-3
squad during that training out at the Gunpowder Range. The two EVU men did not participate in
the training. From left to right (standing) are: EVU Officer Roland Andrews, EVU Sgt. Dave
Bryant, Officers Roger Rose, James Siebor, Gary Green, Mike Speedling, Kelly Allen, Lee
Baker, Norm Bleakly, Andy Gersey. From left to right (kneeling) are: Sgt. Joe Key, Steve
Grenfell, George Smith, Mike Hurm, Lenny Rummo, Ed Schillo, and Bob Letmate. Roger Rose
broke his arm badly doing a forward roll with his rifle trying to take a cover position during the
training and wasn’t able to continue in the teams.
I was scheduled to begin training an A Platoon squad in the first departmentally sanctioned
SWAT training on Monday, April 19, 1976. The date is etched in my memory because the worst
shootout in the Department’s history occurred on Good Friday, April 16, 1976. In that incident
one officer, James Halcomb, was killed and five others were seriously injured. It would be
repetitious to go into any detail about the incident in this writing. For further information click
on link: http://baltimorecitypolicehistory.com/citypolice/bpd-history/bcp-minutes-terror.html.
The most important result of the fiasco of the department’s response to the sniper, John Earl
Williams, was that it very much softened, at least for a period, the opposition to SWAT and the
necessity for having a SWAT unit. The incident also served to awaken in some members of
Tactical the realization that being an operator in a SWAT team required a great deal of work and
personal sacrifice. After the dust had somewhat settled, Commissioner Pomerleau made it very
clear, very clear, that he wanted the program to proceed.
Another outcome of the incident that was relevant to the history of the QRT was that it was the
first time any squad had ever functioned as a SWAT team. A-3 squad was working that night.
The training they had done on their own time and the FBI training permitted them to carry out
SWAT functions, although they had no standing as a Quick Response Team because the order
had not been signed and, as a result, they had not received QRT certification. The SWAT
functions carried out that night were: support and observers for the counter sniper, EVU Officer
Bob Powell; a gas delivery team headed by Lieutenant Duggins; an evacuation team to retrieve
Officer Halcomb (one squad member and a Western District officer, Frank Stallings, were able to
retrieve him, while the others provided cover fire); and, once Officer Halcomb was out of the line
of fire and Williams had been forced out of the house by a barrage of suppression/cover fire, the
evacuation team members entered and cleared the house. The only names of A-3 squad
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personnel that were there that night that I’ve been able to determine to a certainty were: Gersey
and Green, CS support; Rummo, Schillo, Seibor, Hurm, evacuation and entry teams. Given the
team members minimal training and lack of SWAT operational experience, they performed well
in an extraordinarily difficult situation. Their performance demonstrated that SWAT training,
even if rudimentary by today’s standards, and SWAT teams were a necessary element in handling
this type of critical event.
The first Tactical officers to receive QRT certification did so in October 1977, the same time the
General Order was finally signed and published. The attached photo shows the members of that
group. The members shown in the photo are from left to right: Colonel Ron Mullen, Captain
John Schmitt (Colonel Mullen and Captain Schmidt did not undergo the training), Steve
Grenfell, Bob Letmate, Neal Hairston, Dave Hollingsworth, Burch Schwabline, Denis Dean, Jim
Giza, Bob Franklin, John Maguire, Bob Foltz, Doug Bryson, Matt Immler, Mike Mulligan, Al
Erhardt, Tony Garcia, Lt. Joe Key, Lt. John Wagner.
The selection process to become a functioning member of the teams included passing a minimal
physical fitness test, a forty hour training course, an interview with current team members, and a
psychological exam. The first operational members were picked from existing Tactical Section
personnel. None could be eliminated because of failing any part of the selection criteria,
including the psychological exam. This was not my decision, it came from on high against my
strenuous objection. In those first days, a number of the men assigned to Tactical were there
because some higher up put them there as a reward for extraordinary performance above and
beyond the call of duty in the fine art of ass kissing and/or being related to said higher-up. They
weren’t there to do the job, nor, in many cases, could they. Those men that were issued the first
QRT Certificates and Pins qualified in all of the categories and marked the beginning of what
could be considered, at the time, a reasonably trained and operational SWAT team. As the teams
progressed, men came to Tactical because they wanted to be members of SWAT and wanted it
badly enough to meet the standards. As the SWAT concept matured, the selection process
became more selective and the team members more capable.
The physical fitness test was loosely modeled after the Marine Corps Squad Leader training
program. The minimum number of pull-ups to qualify was five, which received twenty points.
Each additional pull-up resulted in three points up to a maximum of fifteen pull-ups, which was
awarded fifty points. The minimum number of push-ups and sit-ups (no time limit) was twenty
and the maximum was fifty. Twenty of either exercise garnered twenty points with each
additional repetition earning one point up to a total of fifty points for each exercise. The final
physical requirement was to run one mile in eight minutes or less. The maximum score of fifty
was given for running the mile in six minutes or less, with one point added for each four seconds
under the eight minute minimum. To qualify for the training program a candidate had to achieve
all of the minimums and have an overall score of one hundred points. As I said, in the beginning
no member of Tactical was excluded from operating on a team because of failing any of the
selection requirements. Some of the initial teams, prior to the certification in 1977, were staffed
by personnel who could only hang on the pull-up bar and barely eke out as few as ten push-ups or
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sit-ups. They functioned but certainly not anywhere near the level of current operators nor the
level that should have been mandated for their safety and the requirements of the missions they
undertook.
My criticism is not of the courage and dedication of most of those officers. After all, they
undertook the same kind of dangerous situations that later teams would face and they did it with
woefully inadequate equipment and minimal training. Any criticism is directed solely toward
those members of command that were protecting or attempting to increase their personal
fiefdoms by insisting that everyone needed to have a “slice of the pie.” Lt. Duggins and I were
told that specifically by a Tac captain, who replaced Captain Bolesta as the Commanding Officer
of Tactical. Duggins’ response was classic Duggins: his jaw tightened, his eyes narrowed, his
voice became gravelly, and through clinched teeth, he said, “I will run my f...ing platoon the way
I see fit. The day I’m told to put some do-nothing, tub of s..t into an operation, somebody’s
going to get his badge shoved up his ass.” That account is accurate in all aspects. My response
to the comment and to the captain’s sputtering, whining reaction was to laugh, which did not
endear me to the good captain. The captain’s reason for his slice of the pie philosophy was that,
by letting everyone in Tactical function as an active QRT member regardless of competency, he
lessened the chance of offending some departmental or political VIP who was responsible for
assigning his/her protégée slug to QRT.
That captain was constantly in the business of advancing his fine self up the departmental ladder
by any means necessary. He imagined that his journey up that ladder somehow included taking
the programs or justifications I wrote and having his secretary retype them for his signature. I
never protested because my concern was that the program advance and, if having the captain’s
signature on those documents, assisted in that process, it was fine with me. In the end, none of
that helped him advance, he retired as a captain. As for Duggins, he didn’t care about advancing
his career. He was assigned to Tactical based only on his reputation and merit. Command
officers took him on at their peril: he was a brilliant writer and fearless. Commissioner
Pomerleau, himself a retired Marine Colonel with a well deserved reputation of being a hard
charger, admired and respected Duggins. This was, in part, because of Duggins’ stellar
reputation in the department and, in part, because of Duggins’ service in the Marines, including
surviving the Chosin Reservoir Campaign.
The slice of the pie the Tactical captain was talking about was a very risky, dangerous business in
both street operations and training. The slices were being handed out, in some cases, to men who
had no interest in being genuinely qualified and capable of undertaking the hard work necessary
to become even minimally proficient in the job of a SWAT operator. One such individual, who
personified the captain’s flawed slice of the pie theory, was the sergeant he picked to replace me
as the supervisor of A-3 squad, when I was transferred to the EVU section to train and run QRT
full time. He was selected to increase the arrest statistics of the squad. He later distinguished
himself by jack-potting not only himself but several members of the squad. He accomplished
this by implementing a contest wherein squad members who made the most arrests received time
off. The contest was found to have racial overtones, in addition to the obvious violations of
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departmental regulations. The sergeant was eventually forced to resign because of allegations
that he was selling arrest record information to a local company in violation of federal law. From
the beginning, he had zero interest in becoming a member of SWAT and even less desire to pass
the minimum physical fitness test. As would be expected, he miserably failed all of the physical
fitness qualification tests.
One training incident that sergeant was involved in serves to make the point about the necessity
to select the best of the best as team operators. I had the pleasure of “rescuing” his fine, fat self
in a rappelling exercise out at the Gunpowder rappelling tower. To his credit, he forced himself
off the simulated helicopter pad even though he was scared of heights. He was prompted to take
the plunge by being told he had to do it or he would be sent back to Tac. I referred to him as
being fat because that fact was part of the reason he became hung up five feet under the pad and
forty-five feet from the ground. I was alerted to his situation by his squeals and hurled
obscenities decrying his unpleasant, to him, circumstance; said circumstance was mildly amusing
to the rest of us. He was, contrary to specific instructions, wearing a loose sweatshirt to cover his
very prominent mid-section. The sweatshirt got caught in the carabiner and twisted around the
line; thus, locking him on the line and leaving him dangling above the ground. I told him that it
was time for lunch and that I would think about how to get him down over lunch, but he loudly
and emotionally insisted that I get him down. His actions and volume while screaming
invectives at me and others, some of whom were displaying a lack of sensitivity by openly
laughing at his situation, convinced me he was, indeed, in mortal peril from the immediate
potential of suffering a stroke. I then dropped down next to him with knife in hand. I told him
that the only way I could figure to get him to the ground was to cut the line. Again, he very
loudly and emotionally told me that he just didn’t think that was the best option. As I recall, in
expressing his opinions about his predicament and my response to it, he actually used some
obscene language directed toward me, which included statements regarding the legitimacy of my
birth. Having a thick skin, I ignored his misdirected and undeserved insults and tied him off with
another carabiner and line. He was then lifted up enough by several team members, who pulled
mightily on the secondary line to achieve that result, to take the pressure off the original line.
When they had pulled him high enough, I was able to cut the sweatshirt away from the line. He
then completed his trip to the ground. Duggins and I used that sweatshirt in training future
classes to make the point that wearing non approved clothing had potentially dangerous
consequences.
On a serious note, while we had some fun at the chunky sergeant’s expense, it was just a training
exercise. In a real situation his failure to abide by basic safety rules and his lack of the physical
wherewithal to climb the rope back to the point he could have freed the jammed shirt would have
endangered himself, his team, and the operation. This incident demonstrates the folly of the
theory that everyone should have a slice of the pie, regardless of their inability to fulfill the
absolutely necessary requirements to become a member of a SWAT team. Further, it determines
to a certainty the potentially catastrophic consequences of that theory.
The first certified QRT member’s training course was based on a program that was a patchwork
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of a combination of one week courses I taught combined with the course taught by the FBI. The
course included: team composition and functions; individual functions within a team; necessary
equipment; basic room entry techniques; scenario practical problems; and first aid. Rappelling
and weapons familiarization training and qualifications were taught separately in one and two
day programs. The day began at 0700 hours with calisthenics. Classes began at 0800 and
continued until 1600 with a half hour for lunch. At 1600 hours troops suited up and ran to the
gas chamber, where they had to put on their M-17 masks after two mini CS grenades were
ignited. They stayed in the chamber until it was certain that the masks had been put on correctly
and that they worked properly. Each member was then required to take off the mask and clearly
recite his name, entry on duty date, sequence number, and, depending on how anxious he was to
exit the chamber, his social security number, birthday, number and names of children, etc. After
the gas chamber, the squad would run the military’s obstacle course and then back to the
classroom. Usually, clock-out time was around 1800 hours.
On one occasion when we were running the obstacle course, the skies opened up and it started
pouring. Additionally, thunder and lightning settled right on top of us. As we started running
back to the classroom, Bob Letmate remarked that the good news was that it couldn’t get any
worse. He picked a terrible time to say it, because the words were no more out of his mouth than
what had been merely pouring became buckets and two lightning strikes hit trees within fifty
yards of us. They were so close that the hair on my arms and head stood up. The strikes had a
very positive effect on those members who were normally somewhat reticent about running. It
was a full out sprint back to the classroom and not accomplished in a military manner.
The interview process was not in place when the first Tactical officers were SWAT trained and
became operational. As new officers were assigned to Tactical, the process was implemented
and became more refined as time passed. The interview had the same questions asked of every
candidate. The questions ranged from why the person wanted to become a member to technical
questions involving knowledge of weapons, etc. The selection board was made up of certified
QRT members and a certified QRT team leader. Supervisors were not required to be certified at
that time; again, not my choice. To be selected to go to the training program, a candidate had to
be approved by the majority of the board. The board was still not fully operational by the time I
left Tac in October 1977.
The psychological evaluation was started shortly after Lombard and Carey in April 1976.
Psychology Consultants Associated was chosen to develop an evaluation for prospective
members of the teams. Dr. Gill Claperton, the head of the organization at the time, Dr. Ken
Sachs, the current head, and Dr. Dan Stern rode with me for a few nights to get a feel for what
cops did in the city. We didn’t encounter any QRT situations, but they did enhance their
understanding of the world of BPD cops by being introduced to the night denizens and life in the
areas of Pennsylvania Avenue in the Western, North Avenue and Harford Road then in the
Northern, and Reisterstown Road in the Northwestern District. A good time was had by all and I
escaped without being committed. The evaluation, in addition to the normal battery of tests to
determine potential mental problems, was designed to identify officers who could sit, stand, or lie
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in a position for hours in weather varying from blistering hot to sub-freezing cold without losing
concentration and, at the same time, being prepared to jump into the middle of a catastrophe in a
split-second while exhibiting absolute control.
As far as equipping the teams, members from both A and B Platoons chipped in and bought the
rappelling lines and gloves with which we trained. Later, when the teams became operational,
they bought surplus canteens, a small pack, web gear, and the dark blue “bread truck driver”
overalls that became the first uniforms of SWAT. They had to sew on the BPD shoulder patches
and color them with permanent, black magic markers. The BPD did supply the team members
with baseball hats with the BPD emblem on it, but, again, they had to color it black.
Regarding other equipment, the only protective vests available were WWI era Spooner Flack
Jackets. They didn’t stop bullets, but, if someone heaved a low powered WWI type grenade that
hit far enough away, the vests offered some level of protection, ditto for a sniper throwing rocks
but hopefully not shooting them out of a slingshot. The firearms the teams were initially
equipped with were .30 caliber Plainfield carbines which, according to a study done by Paul
Davis, had a one in eight failure rate. My requests earlier and Davis’ request, accompanied by
his study, to replace the carbines were rejected by Commissioner Pomerleau who reportedly said
he had carried one in WWII and Korea and it had served him admirably. The Plainfields issued
to QRT were cheap imitations of the Winchester carbines the military carried. In addition to the
carbines, QRT cops carried their issued revolvers and at least one team member would have a
Remington 870, 12 gage shotgun. M-16's could be checked out from the EVU on approval of the
On Scene Commander and dependent on his/her assessment of the severity of the incident. The
first actual deployment of the M-16's occurred on July 4, 1975. Sergeant Frank Russo and I were
deployed as overwatch and security on the Domino Sugar towers across from Fort McHenry
where President Gerald Ford was addressing the fifth annual “Our Country” celebration. I have
no records as to when they began to be used in SWAT street situations. The 5.56mm Mini-14's
were introduced in 1981 and replaced the carbines.
As written earlier, the first actual SWAT type operation wherein small units were deployed for
specific missions occurred at Lombard and Carey and was carried out successfully by a team with
minimal training and no SWAT operational experience. After finishing with my debriefing by
Colonel Robinson and Captain Bolesta at approximately 2:00 a.m., I was ordered to be back in
Tac Headquarters by 7:00 the next morning to put together two cars which would begin
patrolling that day from 1800 to 0200 hours. The cars were designated as 1991A and 1991B.
They were outfitted with a WW1 footlocker type box that contained one .30 caliber carbine with
two loaded magazines and a carton of .30 caliber carbine ammunition, two Spooner Vests, a box
of 12 gage .00 buck and a box of 12 gage rifled slugs, six CS mini-grenades, a first aid kit, and
sundry other items that I can’t recall. There was also a box that contained a shotgun. The
officers were to be deployed only to sniper/barricade situations. The duty was performed by A-3
squad members exclusively for a month or so, until other members of A and B Platoons
completed training and were qualified, albeit not certified. The cars were phased out around
1986. A large van replaced them, but it had to be picked up at headquarters and brought to the
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scene of an incident. According to current SWAT operator and trainer, Steve Coughlan, the cars
became operational again in 1995 after the North Hollywood, CA shootout at the bank. They
were phased out again in 1997, at which time the teams went back to the large van/truck concept.
The next and much more successful SWAT operation occurred two weeks to the day after
Lombard and Carey. A recently released inmate from an Illinois prison came home on Ann
Street and found his partner in the arms of another man. He went berserk and started shooting up
the neighborhood with a .22 rifle. Southeast District officers secured the outer perimeter and
called QRT. The 1991 cars responded along with other members of A Platoon. Captain Bolesta
was On Scene Commander and set up his command post at the corner of Fleet and Ann Streets.
He deployed a counter sniper with a spotter, gas teams, and an entry team. CS gas was deployed
from shotgun launchers and a 37mm gas launcher. The gas eventually drove the subject out of
the house. When he came out, he had the rifle. He pointed it toward the counter sniper position
and was shot by Mike Sullens with a .243 Remington model 700 rifle. Sullens, a member of A
Platoon, was assigned as the observer, but the EVU man had given the rifle to him, because he
had to take a personal relief. An evacuation team went down and carried the individual from the
scene. An entry team consisting of 1991 personnel then made entry and cleared the house.
This was a text book operation that deployed every Tactical asset in the way they were meant to
be used. The G.O. was still more than a year away from being implemented, but Lombard and
Carey had taught hard lessons to both command and district officers. Commissioner Pomerleau
was quoted in the Sun as saying that the shooting was the way the BPD would handle such
incidents, “. . . one shot, one kill.” The Fleet and Ann Street incident served to convince some of
the doubters and nay sayers in the department, command and officers alike, that the SWAT
concept could work and could save police officers’ lives. The journey forward would still be
extremely difficult and fraught with roadblocks erected by members of command who saw
SWAT as infringing on their territories and/or potentially reducing their time in the spotlight.
Regardless, SWAT was on its way and the two incidents in the spring of 1976 provided a solid
foundation as to why the concept was necessary and how well it could work when implemented
correctly.
QRT/SWAT GROWS UP
In doing research for this writing, I spoke to Dr. Ken Sachs, President, Psychology Consultants
Associated, who said that the evaluations PCA still does for potential SWAT candidates show
that they exhibit the traits of elite professionals, that they want to be part of the best of the best,
that they like the program’s tough, enhanced training, and are very physically fit. He went on to
say he is very impressed by their quality and that he admires them. As written earlier, the intent
of the evaluation, in addition to the normal battery of tests to determine potential mental
problems, was to identify officers who could withstand extreme conditions for long periods of
time without losing concentration and, at the same time, being prepared to jump into the middle
of a catastrophe in a split-second while exhibiting absolute control.
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Those are not routine qualifications nor are they the traits of ordinary men. As an example of an
incident that showed the absolute necessity for those traits, the longest lasting barricade/shooting
incident in the history of the Baltimore Police Department occurred on May 11 and 12 of 1987.
Team members Bob Edwards, Ray Jones, Steve Kuhn, Bob Letmate, Lee Towers, and Sam Tress
confronted an armed, coke snorting, bad guy named Jarrod Clayton, who had taken several
hostages in an incident that came to be known simply as Chase Street. Clayton had been stopped
by an Eastern District officer at around 4:00 p.m. on the 11th for a field interview. He had drugs
and two guns on him. He ran from the officer, firing a shot as he escaped. He broke into 1703
Chase Street and took eleven people hostage. Sam Tress, who had been switched from running
QRT to supervising the Hostage Negotiation Team, began negotiations shortly after the
command post became operational. QRT entered the house at approximately 7:30 p.m. The
operation ended in a gunfight and fire, which destroyed the house a little after 7:00 the next
morning.
The high temperature on the 11th was 89o and the building was a three story row house with no air
conditioning. The team was fully suited up with heavy vests that contained front and back
ceramic plates, M-17 gas masks, CS mini-grenades, and extra ammunition. Tress, Towers, and
Edwards were armed with shotguns and Letmate had a Mini-14. Jones and Kuhn carried their
issued .38 caliber revolvers and recently purchased ballistic shields. The team spent the next
approximately twelve hours in the miserably hot house until the gunfight and a fire ended the
operation.
Regarding the bunker, Sam Tress, when he was the QRT supervisor and trainer, had ordered two
ballistic bunkers for the teams some months earlier. He received some push back from a City
Hall bean counter, who told him that he, the bean counter, had found some bunkers that were
cheaper. Sam asked him if they met the specifications he had submitted and, when the man said
no, Sam told him pointedly to buy the ones he had ordered. The bunkers had arrived a month or
so before Chase Street. One of the bunkers took two hits and another took one, saving team
members’ lives. It was the first recorded incident in the U.S. where a bunker had taken fire in an
actual operation.
The On Scene Commander, Major Barnes, gave the green-light for the sniper, Dave Gunter, to
take a shot when he could. Gunter, who knew the man was reportedly armed and had fired a shot
at a cop, had seen the man moving around in the house, but could not take the shot because he
did not have the green-light at that time. After he received the go ahead from Barnes, Deputy
Commissioner Ron Mullen, who called the command post from his home, restricted the order to
fire only if the man appeared in a window with a gun in his hand. Gunter never had a clear shot
after that. Had the green-light been issued earlier, Pomerleau’s previously stated “one shot, one
kill” policy could have ended the affray fairly quickly. The team was ordered in at 7:00 p.m.
Tress became part of the team in an attempt to conduct face to face negotiations after the team
was fired upon early in the evening. His negotiations resulted in the hostages being released
throughout the night and early morning until the last hostage was set free at approximately 4:00
a.m. The EVU began deploying gas after the last hostage was freed. A total of approximately
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twenty-five to thirty rounds of both ferret and 37mm CS gas munitions were lobbed into the
house. The CS had no effect on Clayton, who had ingested approximately 80 caps of cocaine
during the night and morning. The team assaulted the third floor, where Clayton was barricaded
in the bathroom, at approximately 7:00 a.m. Clayton fired continuously through the walls at the
team. At one point he appeared, said he had been shot, and fired directly at them. The team
returned fire, hitting him several times. Kuhn threw one CS mini that hit the bathroom door
frame, where Clayton was holed up. It bounced down the hallway into a pile of trash and
clothing, which ignited the fire that eventually burned the house down. The fire forced the team
to exfiltrate the house. They had to run past the bathroom where Clayton was and used the
shields and suppression fire to execute their exfiltration safely. The gunfight lasted on and off
for approximately fifteen minutes. Clayton fired approximately forty rounds throughout the
event. Even though they had been fired upon earlier, the team had not returned fire until they
engaged Clayton directly during the last effort to take him into custody. Clayton was struck
numerous times, but, thanks to the ballistic shields, no operators were hit.
The burning of the house resulted in the department banning the use of incendiary chemical
munitions. Also, the department refused to reimburse team members for the speed loaders they
had used, because they were not departmentally issued. If Pomerleau’s “one shot, one kill”
policy had been in effect from the beginning, Chase Street would have been over before the team
was deployed. All of the team members were awarded Silver Stars for their courageous actions.
The memo from Tac Commander, Major Regis Raffensberger, recommending them for the
Medal of Honor is attached.
Another example of team operators working for a long period of time in extreme conditions,
which were the polar (pun intended) opposite of the those existing during Chase Street, occurred
on February 16, 1994. Counter snipers Mike Mulligan, a QRT plank holder from 75, Bob Foltz,
another plank holder from 77, and Jan Richmond lay prone in the snow in freezing temperatures
in a hostage situation taking turns off and on their rifles from approximately 10:30 p.m. to
approximately 3:30 a.m. At that time the bad guy held the baby he had been holding hostage in
front of the apartment window and was attempting to put a pistol in her mouth. Mulligan fired a
single shot from a position approximately seventy-five yards away and at a steep downward
angle from the suspect. The man was hit in the center of his face, but, because his face was
slightly turned, the bullet exited below his ear. After Mulligan fired the shot, the suspect got
back on the phone with negotiator Sam Tress and said, “you m.....f...ers shot me.” He made the
statement with half his jaw shot off. His voice reflected that, for him, unpleasant circumstance,
because his words were, in Tress’s description of the call, quite “jumbled.” John Wagner, On
Scene Commander, then ordered the QRT operators, previously deployed at the suspect’s door,
to make an entry. The team breached the door and one of the entry team officers, Curtis Willis,
fired two shots striking the subject twice. The subject had shot the baby, but she survived. Both
Chase Street and this incident served to validate PCA’s evaluation criteria and proved the point
that the requirements for being a member of the teams were not the routine qualifications nor
traits of ordinary men.
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I have recounted violent SWAT situations to emphasize points regarding the difficulty of
overcoming departmental resistance to the SWAT concept, the consequences arising therefrom,
the validity of testing procedures, the evolution of the teams, and the acceptance of the necessity
for those teams. In reality the mandate for SWAT teams is that they exercise complete control
over a situation in order to handle it with minimal violence. If, however, violence becomes
necessary, the training of the operators and the quality of their equipment must be able to
instantly bring overwhelming force to resolve the threat. Today’s Baltimore Police Department
SWAT teams are more than capable of fulfilling that mandate and resolving any threat.
I spoke at length to Steve Coughlan, a member of QRT/SWAT since 1994 and a current trainer
for the teams. He took a great deal of time from his busy life, including caring for his wife and
brand new baby, to describe the current training, equipment, and operational strategies of today’s
BPD SWAT teams. Steve Kuhn, although retired from the BPD, also provided much
information. The teams are trained, equipped, and operate in a world about which us old-timers,
in our wildest fantasies back in 1976, couldn’t have even dreamed.
The physical fitness test’s minimal requirements and passing the interview process are now
strictly observed. No officer can attend the three week SWAT course without running a mile and
one-half in twelve and one-half minutes or less, doing a minimum of five pull-ups, and fifty
push-ups and sit-ups. The test is now being modified to include, in addition to the standard
physical fitness measures, job related functions.
Once selected, the SWAT trainers will host a three week class that consists of five days of
classroom work and ten days of various practicums, including scenario training with issued
weapons using Simunitions. The majority of attendees are from the BPD, but other agencies and
military personnel frequently attend. Once the attendees have passed the course, a few of the top
candidates are selected to fill vacancies in the teams. Those men are then sent for a five day
course to qualify them on the M-4 rifles that each team member is issued. Once they are serving
in the teams, an operator can request to be trained as a sniper/observer. If selected, that member
is then sent to a three week course hosted by either the Maryland State Police or Baltimore
County Police. Occasionally, the BPD SWAT trainers will host the class. All sniper/observers
are, therefore, also qualified as SWAT operators. To keep their skills honed to perfection, the
sniper/observers practice twice monthly.
The equipment the teams now have is the best of the best. Each operator is assigned a 5.56
caliber M-4, which is a short barreled rifle that is effective both as an entry weapon and at
moderately long distances. They also have their issued Glock .40 caliber pistols. They must
qualify with every weapon they use at or above the ninety percentile level on advanced firearms
qualifications courses specifically designed for special operations personnel. Sniper/observers
must shoot a one hundred percent score on every qualification course.
In addition to firearms, the teams now have other state of the art equipment, including bullet
resistant vests, which are considerably lighter than the old models, Kevlar helmets, and, recently,
14
green uniforms that are designed specifically for SWAT operators. Members who are assigned
on a rotating basis to respond to critical incidents from home are provided with take home
cruisers. There are two equipment vans, which are being replaced by top of the line Mercedes
Benz Sprinters. These are specifically designed for special operations use. These vans are kept
in a secure location and are picked up when a SWAT type incident occurs and/or when they are
conducting a raid. Finally, they have a Lenco Bearcat Armored Rescue Vehicle, which can be
deployed very quickly when needed.
Operationally, the teams, for the most part, work only on SWAT related activities. They
frequently conduct raids which involve the potential for extreme violence; i.e., raids where the
presence of a firearm(s) that is(are) likely to be used is an element, and/or raids involving gangs.
Of course, their duties also include response to all hostage, barricade, sniper, or active shooter
situations. The teams are particularly proud of the fact that they haven’t had to fire a shot since
2008. Considering the potential for violence and number of incidents they handle, that is truly a
record of which to be proud.
A quote that is attributed to George Orwell describes the mission and character of the SWAT
teams: “People sleep peaceably in their beds at night only because rough men stand ready to do
violence on their behalf.” Rough describes their dedication to the hard work necessary to achieve
the status of a SWAT operator and ready, although not anxious, to do violence describes the
grueling training they have undergone in becoming one. They are superbly trained and equipped,
and are the epitome of professional SWAT operators. They are more than any of us, who were
involved fifty years ago in trying to get the SWAT albatross off the ground, could have imagined.
The teams have grown up indeed.
EPILOGUE
The writing of this has been a labor of love. Although I have tried to give proper credit to all of
those I could remember that contributed to making the teams what they are today, I’m certain that
I have left some out. I apologize for that. That the Baltimore Police Department now has such
men in its SWAT teams to protect the citizens of Baltimore, is a credit to the administrations and
the SWAT members, told and untold, that made it so.
Today’s world presents challenges to police departments that were unheard of at the time of the
teams’ beginning. Active shooters killing dozens in malls or schools will require the best of the
best to stop them. On the horizon is the certainty that this country will suffer attacks from rabid,
religion driven, zealots. The attacks will be horrendous and, unless stopped immediately, result
in terrible losses. While the main effort of law enforcement has to be directed towards
preventing such attacks, the men who respond to those that are not prevented will have to be very
“rough” and “ready” indeed. The men they will face may have undergone rigorous military
training and will possess a furor to carry out their missions that is beyond the capability of
normal people to understand. SWAT trainers and supervisors will have to constantly confer with
intelligence assets, departmental and otherwise, to foresee when and where the attacks might
15
come. Those likely locations will have to be constantly monitored and plans developed to
respond effectively in case of a critical event. This adds an intelligence element to the SWAT
concept. It also follows the military model for creating contingency plans to respond to any
threat to the security of this country.
In the world of today, there are many critics of the perceived militarization of police departments.
It is unfortunate that some incidents have occurred where law enforcement special operations
units and their equipment have been used inappropriately. Regardless, given the state of affairs
as they exist today, police departments must have special operations units that train in conformity
with military models and use equipment that the military uses. The qualifications and training of
SWAT operators cannot be lessened and, in fact, may have to be intensified. The police
department is the first line of defense against those that would kill the citizens the department is
sworn to protect. There is no alternative to having SWAT teams that are capable to meet all
threats, even if they work in the manner and look like they are a military unit in doing so. There
is, also, no alternative but to have sufficient controls in place, which will clearly distinguish
between what SWAT teams can do as law enforcement officers and how that differs from the
role of the military. Finally, to ensure the citizens’ confidence, the department should reach out
and educate them as to the rationale and operational protocols of the SWAT concept. In the
tough times ahead, the department will need to have the complete support of the citizens to
address the critical incidents of tomorrow. Given the outstanding performance and professional
quality of the current SWAT teams, there is no doubt that the Baltimore Police Department will
be able to meet and overcome all of tomorrow’s challenges. I pray it will be so.
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POLICE INFORMATION
Copies of: Your Baltimore Police Department Class Photo, Pictures of our Officers, Vehicles, Equipment, Newspaper Articles relating to our department and or officers, Old Departmental Newsletters, Lookouts, Wanted Posters, and or Brochures. Information on Deceased Officers and anything that may help Preserve the History and Proud Traditions of this agency. Please contact Retired Detective Kenny Driscoll.
NOTICE
How to Dispose of Old Police Items
If you come into possession of Police items from an Estate or Death of a Police Officer Family Member and do not know how to properly dispose of these items please contact: Retired Detective Ken Driscoll - Please dispose of POLICE Items: Badges, Guns, Uniforms, Documents, PROPERLY so they won’t be used IMPROPERLY.
Anyone with information, photographs, memorabilia, or other "Baltimore City Police" items can contact Ret. Det. Kenny Driscoll at
Copyright © 2002 Baltimore City Police History - Ret Det Kenny Driscoll
